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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Commenting on the economic calamity that was the 
South Sea Bubble—in which he lost a considerable fortune—
Sir Isaac Newton is said to have remarked, “I can calculate the 
motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of the 
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people.”1 Throughout its history, the trade of public securities 
has proven to be both a powerful engine of economic growth 
and an occasionally harsh reminder that what goes up must 
come down.  
In this securities fraud class action, former shareholders 
allege that Altisource Asset Management Corporation and 
several of its officers (collectively AAMC) inflated the price 
of its stock through false and misleading statements. When 
these mistruths were revealed to the market, the allegation 
goes, the price of AAMC’s stock plummeted, costing 
shareholders billions of dollars. The District Court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that 
Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4. We agree and affirm. 
I 
A. Factual Background2 
 1. William Erbey and Ocwen Financial 
AAMC is one of several independent, but affiliated, 
companies founded by William Erbey. The first company, 
Ocwen Financial, was created in 1988 and became the 
country’s largest purchaser of non-performing mortgage loans 
in the 1990s. Companies earn profit from non-performing 
mortgages by either efficiently foreclosing on the underlying 
                                              
1 Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost 69 
(1999). The earliest accounts of Newton’s comment vary 
slightly. See Joseph Spence, Anecdotes, Observations, and 
Characters 368 (Samuel Singer, ed., 1820).  
2 This factual background, unless otherwise indicated, 
is taken from the operative complaint and accepted as true. 
Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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properties or by bringing the loans to current status. Once 
current, the mortgages can either provide a reliable stream of 
income or be resold at a premium. Ocwen came to specialize 
in the servicing of non-performing loans. Mortgage servicing 
is essentially a specialized form of debt collection, but in the 
context of non-performing mortgages it is a notoriously 
difficult and labor-intensive task. Ocwen gradually 
transitioned from primarily servicing its own loans to acquiring 
mortgage servicing rights from others. Large mortgage holders 
sometimes contract with third parties for loan servicing, 
typically paying the servicer a fee based on the unpaid principal 
balance of the serviced properties. Business was thin for 
Ocwen during the housing boom of the late 1990s and early 
2000s because rising property values limited the number of 
non-performing mortgages. The large banks, which owned a 
majority of U.S. mortgages, were generally able to manage 
their own (comparatively few) non-performing loans. 
 The 2008 housing crisis changed this picture. As droves 
of borrowers fell behind on their mortgages, the largest 
mortgage holders found themselves ill-equipped to service the 
ballooning number of delinquent, non-performing loans. This 
led to widespread corner-cutting—e.g., robo-signing of 
foreclosure documents, fraudulent affidavits, and other abusive 
servicing practices—which culminated in the 2012 National 
Mortgage Settlement. Under this agreement, the nation’s five 
largest mortgage holders, all banks, agreed to provide more 
than $50 billion worth of relief to mistreated homeowners. 
What was the National Mortgage Settlement?, Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau (updated May 10, 2018), perma.cc/CA8Z-E8HC.   
In this environment, Ocwen’s experience in servicing 
non-performing mortgages proved exceptionally 
advantageous—and profitable. As banks sought to avoid the 
financial hazards and regulatory scrutiny of servicing non-
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performing and sub-prime loans, Ocwen was there to buy up 
staggering quantities of mortgage servicing rights. From 2009 
to 2013, Ocwen’s servicing portfolio grew from approximately 
350,000 properties to more than 2.8 million. Consent Order 
Pursuant to New York Banking Law § 44 at 2, In the Matter of 
Ocwen Fin. Corp., N.Y. Dep’t Fin. Servs. (Dec. 22, 2014), 
perma.cc/26XF-VMM2 (hereinafter the 2014 DFS Consent 
Order). The aggregate unpaid principal balance of the 
properties Ocwen serviced correspondingly grew from $50 
billion to more than $464 billion. Id. By the end of 2013, 
Ocwen had become the fourth largest mortgage servicer in the 
U.S., and the largest servicer of sub-prime loans. Id. at 1. In 
addition to efficiently servicing and foreclosing on distressed 
properties, Ocwen also led the industry with programs 
designed to help underwater borrowers stay in their homes. See 
Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During 
the Financial Crisis, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 723, 763–64 (2013). 
Ocwen’s willingness to expand its role in the mortgage 
industry made it attractive to investors looking for 
opportunities to re-enter the market following the 2008 crisis. 
Ocwen’s growth and success did not pass without 
notice, however. When Ocwen sought to acquire yet another 
large portfolio of mortgage servicing rights in 2011, the New 
York Department of Financial Services (DFS) raised concerns 
about Ocwen’s growth and scalability. As a condition of DFS 
approval for the acquisition, Ocwen agreed to abide by a 
detailed set of servicing and staffing standards. Agreement on 
Mortgage Servicing Practices, N.Y. Dep’t Fin. Servs. (Sep. 1, 
2011), perma.cc/M6JW-XEET (hereinafter the 2011 DFS 
Agreement). The following year, DFS conducted “a targeted 
examination” of Ocwen, which “identified gaps in the 
servicing records of certain loans that . . . indicate[d] non-
compliance” with the 2011 agreement. Consent Order Pursuant 
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to New York Banking Law § 44 at 2–3, In the Matter of Ocwen 
Loan Serv., LLC, N.Y. Dep’t Fin. Servs. (Dec. 5, 2012), 
perma.cc/5FA8-7SCG (hereinafter the 2012 DFS Consent 
Order). As a result, DFS and Ocwen entered into the 2012 
consent order, which required Ocwen to install an independent, 
on-site monitor to ensure compliance with the 2011 agreement. 
Id. at 4. These regulatory actions did not appear to hinder 
Ocwen’s financial health, however, as the company’s stock 
nearly doubled in the six months following the 2012 order. 
2. The Ocwen Spin-offs 
Also in December 2012—and directly relevant to this 
case—Ocwen completed the spin-off of several independent 
companies related to its core mortgage servicing business. 
Those companies were Altisource Portfolio Solutions (ASPS), 
Altisource Residential Corporation (RESI), and the appellee, 
Altisource Asset Management Corporation (AAMC).3 As 
explained and depicted below, each of these spin-offs—in 
conjunction with Ocwen—would work together to profit from 
various opportunities within the broader real estate market.  
Organizational Chart as of December 31, 2012 
                                              
3 AAMC and RESI were not spun-off from Ocwen 
directly. ASPS was spun-off from Ocwen in 2009, and in 2012 
AAMC and RESI were both spun-off from ASPS. 
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RESI was created to capitalize on the nationwide 
decline in home ownership and the consequent increase in 
demand for rental properties. RESI would acquire non-
performing loans, with Ocwen providing the loan servicing. If 
the mortgage could be brought current, RESI would sell the 
loan for a profit. If not, RESI would foreclose on the home, 
take title, and maintain it as a rental property, with property 
management services provided by ASPS. This strategy for 
converting non-performing loans into rental properties—if 
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performed efficiently—offered significant financial savings 
over the conventional approach of purchasing such properties 
at foreclosure auctions. RESI had no employees, and received 
asset management and corporate governance services from 
AAMC, which itself had only seven employees. RESI—
AAMC’s only client—paid AAMC a management fee based 
on RESI’s available assets. Overall, the Ocwen-affiliated 
companies were highly interrelated and shared a significant 
number of corporate officers. For each company, William 
Erbey was the largest individual shareholder and served as 
Chairman of the Board.  
At first, it appeared as if Erbey and his passel of 
affiliated companies could do no wrong, and the stock price of 
each company enjoyed a meteoric rise. AAMC, in particular, 
began 2013 trading at around $75 per share, but by January 
2014 had risen as high as $1,196 per share. Only one year later, 
however, AAMC had fallen to $160 a share. Each of the other 
Ocwen companies suffered a similar fate. The claims period in 
this case—April 19, 2013 through January 12, 2015—includes 
the bulk of this precipitous rise and fall, which resulted, at least 
in part, from the persistent regulatory actions taken against 
Ocwen during the same time period. 
3. Regulatory Pressure 
By December 2013, Ocwen was the largest non-bank 
mortgage servicer in the U.S. On December 19, 2013, Ocwen 
entered into a consent order with the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and authorities in 49 states and the 
District of Columbia. Consent Judgment, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-cv-2025 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 
2013), perma.cc/5KZP-MW6R (hereinafter the 2013 CFPB 
Consent Order). A CFPB investigation of Ocwen had 
uncovered systemic consumer protection violations, largely 
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attributed to Ocwen’s breakneck acquisition of mortgage 
servicing rights in the preceding years. Pursuant to the 2013 
CFPB consent order, Ocwen agreed to refund over $125 
million to borrowers who had been wrongfully foreclosed upon 
and to provide $2 billion in principal reduction to underwater 
homeowners. Id. at 9–10. Ocwen also agreed to abide by the 
standards outlined in the National Mortgage Settlement, id. at 
9, becoming the first non-bank to do so. 
Throughout 2014, Ocwen and its affiliates also attracted 
more scrutiny from DFS and other government actors. In 
February, DFS halted a proposed $2.7 billion sale of mortgage 
servicing rights to Ocwen from Wells Fargo. Second Amended 
Complaint (SAC) ¶ 164. DFS also sent a public letter to Ocwen 
voicing its concern with “potential conflicts of interest” 
between the Ocwen-related companies. Letter from Benjamin 
M. Lawsky, Superintendent, N.Y. Dept. of Fin. Servs., to 
Timothy Hayes, General Counsel, Ocwen Fin. Corp. (Feb. 26, 
2014), perma.cc/5C52-ZPJ9 (hereinafter the 2014 DFS Letter). 
And later in the year, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) shut RESI out of a government-
sponsored auction of distressed properties. SAC ¶ 166. 
In December 2014, Ocwen entered into yet another 
consent order with DFS, precipitated by the findings of the 
compliance monitor installed under the 2012 consent order. 
2014 DFS Consent Order at 2. The monitor identified several 
significant servicing violations by Ocwen, including (1) failing 
to confirm that it had the right to foreclose before initiating 
foreclosure proceedings, (2) failing to ensure that its 
representations during foreclosure proceedings were correct, 
(3) pursuing foreclosure while loan modification applications 
were pending, and (4) failing to ensure that no foreclosure 
actions were pursued against active duty servicemembers. Id. 
at 5–6. As had the CFPB, the DFS compliance monitor traced 
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many of these problems to widespread technological 
deficiencies in Ocwen’s servicing platform. As Ocwen 
acquired companies and loan portfolios, it also inherited the 
myriad proprietary computer systems used to service those 
loans. Id. at 6–7. Ocwen’s efforts to combine these legacy 
systems had resulted in a number of incompatibilities that 
produced incorrect or outdated loan information. Id. The 
monitor also identified several conflicts of interest among the 
Ocwen-affiliated companies, specifically finding that Erbey 
had not recused himself from several transactions between 
Ocwen and ASPS, resulting in higher costs for Ocwen. Id. at 
9. Pursuant to the 2014 DFS consent order, Ocwen agreed to 
pay $150 million in relief to New York homeowners, and 
Erbey agreed to resign his positions at Ocwen, ASPS, RESI, 
and AAMC. Id. at 10, 17–18. 
None of the above-mentioned regulatory actions were 
brought against AAMC, nor did any action identify improper 
conduct by Erbey relative to his role at AAMC. 
B. Procedural History 
 The initial complaint in this class action was filed on 
January 16, 2015 by City of Cambridge Retirement System. 
After being appointed as lead plaintiff, Denver Employees 
Retirement Plan filed a significantly revised amended 
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complaint, which it captioned its “Consolidated Complaint.”4 
AAMC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the District Court 
granted. Roughly three weeks later, Plaintiffs sought leave to 
reopen the case and further amend the complaint, attaching a 
proposed second amended complaint to its motion.  After 
considering the proposed complaint, the District Court denied 
leave to amend as futile. Plaintiffs then filed this timely appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, a district court’s denial of leave to 
amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. 
Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 
242, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2016). Leave to amend is properly denied 
if amendment would be futile, i.e., if the proposed complaint 
                                              
4 Plaintiffs continue to contend that the District Court 
should not have counted the “Consolidated Complaint” as an 
amended complaint. This contention is both wrong and 
irrelevant. There were not—as is frequently the case—multiple 
complaints in need of consolidation, so the only purpose of the 
revised complaint was to make substantive amendments. In 
any event, because the District Court dismissed due to futility, 
the number of prior opportunities Plaintiffs had to amend is 
immaterial. See In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 
267, 280 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of leave to 
amend because proposed second amended complaint was 
futile); United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, 
LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(suggesting that denial of leave to amend the initial complaint 
would have been justified if the proposed amendment would 
have been futile). 
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could not “withstand a renewed motion to dismiss.” Jablonski 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 
1988). “In assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies the 
same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 
12(b)(6).” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). And as to this legal determination, 
our review is plenary. Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
In determining whether Plaintiffs’ proposed second 
amended complaint states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), we 
accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. However, 
“we disregard threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements.” James 
v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III 
A. The Elements of a Rule 10b–5 Claim 
The proposed complaint charges AAMC with securities 
fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b–5, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b–5.5  The 1934 Act prohibits the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with “the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  More specifically, 
Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful for any person—in connection 
with the sale of any security—“[t]o make any untrue statement 
                                              
5 Plaintiffs’ proposed complaint also alleges that 
AAMC violated § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  They do not discuss this allegation on appeal, and we do 
not consider it in reaching our conclusion. 
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of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b). To state a claim under Rule 10b–5, 
a plaintiff must allege: 
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); 
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; 
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance; 
(5) economic loss; and 
(6) loss causation . . . . 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted). In 
this case—and as is typical—the principal contentions relate to 
only three elements: a material misrepresentation (or 
omission), scienter, and loss causation. See Cal. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 In addition to Rule 12(b)(6), pleadings in Rule 10b–5 
actions must also satisfy the particularity requirements of both 
Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4. Id. Rule 9(b) provides that any 
fraud allegation “must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b). The PSLRA prescribes yet greater particularity relative to 
the elements of material misrepresentation and scienter. With 
respect to material misrepresentation, the PSLRA requires that 
a complaint “specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading, and, if an allegation . . . is made on information 
and belief, . . . all facts on which that belief is formed.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1). With respect to scienter, complaints 
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must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.” Id. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).6  
Far from mere technicalities, enforcement of such 
pleading requirements helps avoid the “abusive” practice of 
plaintiffs with “largely groundless claim[s] . . . simply tak[ing] 
up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so 
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” 
Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (first quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, 
at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); then quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)). To that end, 
the PSLRA seeks “to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, 
while preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious 
claims.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 322 (2007). Allowing claims only in cases of true fraud 
avoids converting private securities actions into “a partial 
downside insurance policy” against the vicissitudes of the 
market. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347–48. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims 
Plaintiffs base their fraud claims on two principal 
classes of statements made by AAMC. First, Plaintiffs argue 
that AAMC misrepresented the benefits attributable to its 
relationship with Ocwen. For example, in its 2012 Annual 
Report filed with the SEC, AAMC stated:  
                                              
6 Because the District Court ruled on futility grounds 
alone, remand would be appropriate if we were to determine 
that the complaint suffered only from a lack of particularity. 
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1435. However, because 
we conclude that the complaint “would not survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion even if pled with more particularity,” no 
remand is necessary. Id. 
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[W]e believe that [RESI’s] access to Ocwen’s 
servicing expertise helps it to maximize the value 
of its loan portfolios and provides it with a 
competitive advantage over other companies 
with a similar focus. 
J.A. 275. Plaintiffs allege that this statement was “materially 
false and misleading because [it] portrayed Ocwen as a benefit 
and a ‘competitive advantage’ to RESI, when Ocwen was 
neither,” SAC ¶ 138, because of its outdated servicing platform 
and regulatory violations. 
 The second category of alleged misrepresentations 
concerns AAMC’s stated policy of requiring its officers—
Erbey in particular—to recuse themselves from any 
transactions involving other Ocwen-affiliated companies. In its 
2013 Annual Report, AAMC stated: 
Each of our executive officers is also an 
executive officer of [RESI] and has interests in 
our relationship with [RESI] that may be 
different than the interests of our 
stockholders. . . . We follow policies, procedures 
and practices to avoid potential conflicts with 
respect to our dealings with [ASPS], Ocwen and 
[RESI], including our Chairman [Erbey] 
recusing himself from negotiations regarding, 
and approvals of, transactions with these 
entities . . . . 
J.A. 324. Plaintiffs allege that this disclosure was “false and 
misleading because it omits to disclose that the Related-Party 
Transaction Policy was widely disregarded by Defendant 
Erbey and others.” SAC ¶ 144. 
 The District Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations 
failed to plausibly allege either a material false statement or 
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loss causation. It did not reach the question of scienter, but on 
appeal AAMC has renewed its argument that the complaint 
should fail on that basis as well. The following sections will 
analyze whether either class of alleged misrepresentations by 
AAMC is sufficient to survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) 
and the PSLRA.7 With regard to the statements concerning 
AAMC’s relationship with Ocwen, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
have not plausibly alleged that the statements were false, and, 
therefore, we need not determine whether Plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled scienter or loss causation. With regard to 
AAMC’s recusal policy, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ failure to 
identify a single AAMC transaction in which Erbey—or some 
other officer—improperly participated renders its allegations 
too speculative to meet the PSLRA’s strict requirements. 
1. Falsity 
 The complaint contains dozens of statements from 
various Ocwen-affiliated companies—not only, or even 
primarily, AAMC—that Plaintiffs characterize as material 
misrepresentations. On the question of falsity, then, the first 
issue to address is the legal significance of statements made by 
companies other than AAMC. Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful 
for any person to “make any untrue statement of a material 
fact,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b), and, with regard to this rule, 
“the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement,” Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011). Therefore, in 
considering whether AAMC made any material 
                                              
7 In general, a complaint that satisfies the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading standards will also satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 
requirements. 
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misrepresentations, we will consider only the statements of 
AAMC (and not RESI, Ocwen, or other affiliated companies). 
 i. Statements Concerning AAMC’s Relationship with 
Ocwen 
 As detailed above, Ocwen underwent significant 
regulatory scrutiny before, during, and after the claims period, 
and multiple regulatory bodies sanctioned it for improper 
servicing practices. In various filings and public statements, 
AAMC described its relationship with RESI and, in turn, 
RESI’s relationship with Ocwen. Plaintiffs allege that (1) 
AAMC knew that Ocwen’s servicing platform was severely 
flawed and therefore a detriment to AAMC, and (2) AAMC’s 
failure to disclose this information about Ocwen constituted a 
material omission. 
 AAMC provided a detailed explanation of its 
relationship with Ocwen in its 2013 Annual Report under the 
heading “Risks Related to Our Management and Our 
Relationships with [ASPS], Ocwen, and [RESI]”: 
[RESI] is contractually obligated to service the 
residential mortgage loans that it acquires. 
[RESI] does not have any employees, servicing 
platform, licenses or technical resources 
necessary to service its acquired loans. 
Consequently, [RESI] has engaged Ocwen to 
service the non-performing and sub-
performing . . . loans it acquires. If for any 
reason Ocwen is unable to service these loans at 
the level and/or the cost that [RESI] 
anticipates, . . . an alternate servicer may not be 
readily available on favorable terms, or at all, 
which could have a material adverse effect on 
[RESI]. 
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J.A. 323, 324. Thus, the annual report explained that RESI 
depended on Ocwen for loan servicing and would be at risk if 
it needed to find a different servicer. The same report also made 
clear that, because RESI was AAMC’s sole source of revenue, 
any risk to RESI applied in equal measure to AAMC. J.A. 309–
10. 
 Plaintiffs argue that, in order to make this report (and 
others like it) not misleading, AAMC was obligated to disclose 
its awareness of problems with Ocwen’s servicing platform. 
But in the context in which these statements were made, there 
was nothing false or misleading about AAMC’s assertions. The 
above-quoted report does not imply anything about the quality 
of Ocwen’s loan servicing, only its capacity (high) and its cost 
(low). Plaintiffs have not alleged that AAMC had any reason 
to believe that Ocwen, whatever its flaws, would be unable to 
service all of the loans RESI sent its way. Nor is there any 
allegation that Ocwen ever did fail to meet its servicing 
obligation to RESI. Given that context, there was nothing 
misleading about AAMC’s disclosed reliance on Ocwen. By 
contrast, suppose AAMC knew at the time of this report that 
Ocwen would soon be unable to take on any additional 
mortgage servicing rights obligations. In that case, AAMC’s 
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statement would be misleading because what it identified as a 
possible risk, was, in truth, known to be imminent.8  
 In effect, Plaintiffs suggest that AAMC’s reference to 
Ocwen carried some form of implied warranty. Plaintiffs 
exhaustively catalogue Ocwen’s regulatory violations, but cite 
no authority to support the conclusion that AAMC was 
obligated to disclose the flaws of a separate entity in its own 
filings. Even assuming that such an obligation could arise in 
some cases, it would make no sense to impose such a 
requirement where, as here, the allegedly “concealed” 
information—Ocwen’s regulatory failures—was not only 
well-known, but typical of most mortgage servicers at the time. 
McCoy, supra, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. at 748 (noting a 2011 Treasury 
Department investigation, which concluded that each of the ten 
largest servicers in the Home Affordable Modification 
Program was deficient); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Corporate 
Wrongdoing: Interactions of Legal Mandates and Corporate 
Culture, 36 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 207, 226 (2016) 
                                              
8 The complaint highlights other AAMC statements 
praising Ocwen, e.g., “We intend to capitalize on the servicing 
capabilities of Ocwen, which we view as superior relative to 
other servicers in terms of cost, management experience, 
technology infrastructure and platform scalability.” SAC ¶ 
136. Such statements are not false because they clearly convey 
a subjective opinion. Moreover, we have consistently held that 
such “vague and general statements of optimism” are non-
actionable precisely because they are not material, i.e., a 
reasonable investor would not base decisions on such 
statements. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 
538–39 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds as 
recognized by Inst. Inv’rs Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 
276 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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(describing mortgage servicing as a “distinct industry-wide 
example of improper conduct,” and discussing a 2015 
Comptroller of the Currency investigation, which found 
repeated noncompliance with servicing standards by several 
parties to the 2012 National Mortgage Settlement); see 
generally Matthew Goldstein, Rachel Adams, & Ben Protess, 
How Housing’s New Players Spiraled Into Banks’ Old 
Mistakes, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2016, goo.gl/GoYTqv.  
Under Rule 10b–5, the misleading nature of a statement 
is evaluated “in the light of the circumstances under which” it 
is made. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b). As was clear under these 
circumstances, AAMC’s statements about Ocwen were 
relevant only insofar as RESI—and, by extension, AAMC—
depended on Ocwen to service the mortgages it acquired. 
AAMC had no reason to believe that Ocwen would be unable 
to fill this role, so its statements to this effect were not 
misleading. 
 ii. Statements Concerning AAMC’s Recusal Policy 
 AAMC claimed in various disclosures that it had 
“policies, procedures and practices” to avoid potential conflicts 
with respect to the other Ocwen-affiliated companies. J.A. 324. 
In particular, these policies required Erbey to “recus[e] himself 
from negotiations regarding, and approvals of, transactions 
with” those companies. Id. Plaintiffs allege that these 
statements were false and misleading because, in reality, Erbey 
had not recused himself from decisions concerning several 
related-party transactions. To support this allegation, the 
complaint primarily relies on a 2015 cease-and-desist order 
issued by the SEC, which concluded that Erbey had failed to 
recuse himself from certain transactions between Ocwen and 
another affiliated company, HLSS. According to Plaintiffs, this 
finding “raises a strong inference that [the defendants] acted in 
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a similar manner with respect to AAMC.” SAC ¶ 145; see id. 
at ¶ 107 (quoting In the Matter of Home Loan Serv. Sols., Ltd., 
SEC Release No. 3713, 2015 WL 5782427, at *1–2 (Oct. 5, 
2015)). 
 By their own admission, Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding 
AAMC’s recusal policy relies on an inference from Erbey’s 
conduct with regard to two separate companies. Even 
accepting that the stringent pleading requirements applicable 
to Rule 10b–5 actions should be “relaxed somewhat where the 
factual information is peculiarly within the defendant’s 
knowledge or control,” Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 
1418, we cannot credit factual allegations, such as this, which 
do not rise “above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). By not identifying a single 
AAMC transaction in which Erbey improperly participated, 
the complaint attempts to establish falsity through the very sort 
of “speculative fraud by hindsight that the [PSLRA] was 
intended to eliminate.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 225 (3d Cir. 2002). 
* 
 Plaintiffs allege that AAMC misrepresented both the 
benefits of its relationship with Ocwen and its adherence to a 
recusal policy designed to protect against conflicts of interest. 
However, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead falsity as 
to either category. The statements concerning AAMC’s 
relationship with Ocwen were not misleading in the context in 
which they were made because AAMC’s reliance on Ocwen 
only extended to its ability to service the loans acquired by 
AAMC. Likewise, the complaint does not plausibly allege that 
AAMC’s statements about its recusal policy were false or 
misleading. Instead, it simply speculates that Erbey must have 
violated the AAMC recusal policy because he is suspected to 
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have done so with other companies. Neither allegation satisfies 
the PSLRA’s strict standards for stating a claim.  
2. Scienter and Loss Causation 
 Even if Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that AAMC 
made false or misleading statements, this alone would not be 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs must also 
plead facts sufficient to create a “strong inference” that AAMC 
intended to defraud shareholders (scienter), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(b)(2)(A), and adequately allege that, when the truth was 
revealed about those fraudulent statements, Plaintiffs suffered 
an economic harm as a result (loss causation), Dura, 544 U.S. 
at 341-42. Both factors are predicated upon a sufficient 
pleading of false or misleading statements. Because we hold 
that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy this first requirement, we decline 
to go so far as to postulate whether AAMC may have intended 
to defraud shareholders with non-fraudulent statements. Nor 
do we speculate whether statements made—that do not correct 
or contradict misleading statements by AMMC—could 
reasonably have caused economic harm to Plaintiffs. Instead, 
we conclude our analysis at our finding of no falsity and hold 
that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  
IV 
The economic harm suffered by AAMC’s investors is 
certainly regrettable, but Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that 
this harm arose from fraud. When a stock experiences the rapid 
rise and fall that occurred here, it will not usually prove 
difficult to mine from the economic wreckage a few 
discrepancies in the now-deflated company’s records. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 104–369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). Hindsight, 
however, is not a cause of action. In passing the PSLRA, 
Congress concluded that the very stability of our capital 
Case: 17-2471     Document: 003113085759     Page: 23      Date Filed: 11/14/2018
24 
markets depends on forestalling meritless suits while 
preserving for “defrauded investors” the “indispensable tool” 
of private litigation. Id. Because Plaintiffs’ complaint falls on 
the wrong side of this carefully-struck balance, we will affirm 
the decision of the District Court. 
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